Sorted sysctl values and lists in READMEs alphabetically (No functional changes). (#371)
* Add s's for consistency. Signed-off-by: Farid Joubbi <[email protected]> * Sort lists alphabetically. Signed-off-by: Farid Joubbi <[email protected]> * Sorted sysctl_config alphabetically. Signed-off-by: Farid Joubbi <[email protected]> * Sort removed protocols. Signed-off-by: Farid Joubbi <[email protected]> * Added dots in variable descriptions for the sake of consistency. Signed-off-by: Farid Joubbi <[email protected]> * Added dots in variable descriptions for the sake of consistency. Signed-off-by: Farid Joubbi <[email protected]>
This commit is contained in:
1 parent
e8e552f3ae
commit
5675589e01
4 files changed
+196
-195
No files matched your search
@@ -53,99 +53,42 @@ ufw_manage_builtins: 'no'
|
||||
ufw_ipt_modules: 'nf_conntrack_ftp nf_nat_ftp nf_conntrack_netbios_ns'
|
||||
|
||||
sysctl_config:
|
||||
# Disable IPv4 traffic forwarding. | sysctl-01
|
||||
net.ipv4.ip_forward: 0
|
||||
# These settings eliminate an entire class of security vulnerabilities:
|
||||
# time-of-check-time-of-use cross-privilege attacks using guessable
|
||||
# filenames (generally seen as "/tmp file race" vulnerabilities).
|
||||
fs.protected_hardlinks: 1
|
||||
fs.protected_symlinks: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable IPv6 traffic forwarding. | sysctl-19
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding: 0
|
||||
# Prevent core dumps with SUID. These are usually only
|
||||
# needed by developers and may contain sensitive information. | sysctl-31
|
||||
fs.suid_dumpable: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# ignore RAs on Ipv6. | sysctl-25
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra: 0
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra: 0
|
||||
# Controls whether core dumps will append the PID to the core filename
|
||||
# Useful for debugging multi-threaded applications
|
||||
kernel.core_uses_pid: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable RFC-recommended source validation feature. | sysctl-02
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter: 1
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter: 1
|
||||
# When an attacker is trying to exploit the local kernel, it is often
|
||||
# helpful to be able to examine where in memory the kernel, modules,
|
||||
# and data structures live. As such, kernel addresses should be treated
|
||||
# as sensitive information.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Many files and interfaces contain these addresses (e.g. /proc/kallsyms,
|
||||
# /proc/modules, etc), and this setting can censor the addresses. A value
|
||||
# of "0" allows all users to see the kernel addresses. A value of "1"
|
||||
# limits visibility to the root user, and "2" blocks even the root user.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some off-the-shelf malware exploit kernel addresses exposed
|
||||
# via /proc/kallsyms so by not making these addresses easily available
|
||||
# we increase the cost of such attack some what; now such malware has
|
||||
# to check which kernel Tails is running and then fetch the corresponding
|
||||
# kernel address map from some external source. This is not hard,
|
||||
# but certainly not all malware has such functionality. | Tails-2
|
||||
kernel.kptr_restrict: 2
|
||||
|
||||
# Reduce the surface on SMURF attacks. | sysctl-04
|
||||
# Make sure to ignore ECHO broadcasts, which are only required in broad network analysis.
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts: 1
|
||||
# kexec is dangerous: it enables replacement of the running kernel. | Tails-3
|
||||
kernel.kexec_load_disabled: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# There is no reason to accept bogus error responses from ICMP, so ignore them instead. | sysctl-03
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Limit the amount of traffic the system uses for ICMP. | sysctl-05
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit: 100
|
||||
|
||||
# Adjust the ICMP ratelimit to include ping, dst unreachable,
|
||||
# source quench, ime exceed, param problem, timestamp reply, information reply | sysctl-06
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_ratemask: 88089
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable IPv6 | sysctl-18
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Protect against wrapping sequence numbers at gigabit speeds | sysctl-07
|
||||
net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Define restriction level for announcing the local source IP | sysctl-08
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Define mode for sending replies in response to
|
||||
# received ARP requests that resolve local target IP addresses | sysctl-09
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_announce: 2
|
||||
|
||||
# RFC 1337 fix F1 | sysctl-10
|
||||
net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Send(router) or accept(host) RFC1620 shared media redirects | sysctl-12
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media: 1
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Accepting source route can lead to malicious networking behavior,
|
||||
# so disable it if not needed. | sysctl-13
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Accepting redirects can lead to malicious networking behavior, so disable
|
||||
# it if not needed. | sysctl-13 | sysctl-14 | sysctl-15 | sysctl-20
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# For non-routers: don't send redirects, these settings are 0 | sysctl-16
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# log martian packets | sysctl-17
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians: 1
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# ipv6 config
|
||||
# Disable acceptance of IPv6 router solicitations messages | sysctl-21
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable Accept Router Preference from router advertisement | sysctl-22
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable learning Prefix Information from router advertisement | sysctl-23
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable learning Hop limit from router advertisement | sysctl-24
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable IPv6 autoconfiguration | sysctl-26
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable neighbor solicitations to send out per address | sysctl-27
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Assign one global unicast IPv6 addresses to each interface | sysctl-28
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# This settings controls how the kernel behaves towards module changes at
|
||||
# This setting controls how the kernel behaves towards module changes at
|
||||
# runtime. Setting to 1 will disable module loading at runtime.
|
||||
# Setting it to 0 is actually never supported. | sysctl-29
|
||||
# kernel.modules_disabled: 1
|
||||
@@ -167,15 +110,9 @@ sysctl_config:
|
||||
# * **256** - nicing of all RT tasks
|
||||
kernel.sysrq: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Prevent core dumps with SUID. These are usually only
|
||||
# needed by developers and may contain sensitive information. | sysctl-31
|
||||
fs.suid_dumpable: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Virtual memory regions protection | sysctl-32
|
||||
kernel.randomize_va_space: 2
|
||||
|
||||
kernel.core_uses_pid: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# The PTRACE system is used for debugging. With it, a single user process
|
||||
# can attach to any other dumpable process owned by the same user. In the
|
||||
# case of malicious software, it is possible to use PTRACE to access
|
||||
@@ -200,6 +137,97 @@ sysctl_config:
|
||||
# kernel.yama.ptrace_scope = 1
|
||||
kernel.yama.ptrace_scope: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable IPv4 traffic forwarding. | sysctl-01
|
||||
net.ipv4.ip_forward: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Enable RFC-recommended source validation feature. | sysctl-02
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.rp_filter: 1
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.rp_filter: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Reduce the surface on SMURF attacks. | sysctl-04
|
||||
# Make sure to ignore ECHO broadcasts, which are only required in broad network analysis.
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_echo_ignore_broadcasts: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# There is no reason to accept bogus error responses from ICMP, so ignore them instead. | sysctl-03
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_ignore_bogus_error_responses: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Limit the amount of traffic the system uses for ICMP. | sysctl-05
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_ratelimit: 100
|
||||
|
||||
# Adjust the ICMP ratelimit to include ping, dst unreachable,
|
||||
# source quench, ime exceed, param problem, timestamp reply, information reply | sysctl-06
|
||||
net.ipv4.icmp_ratemask: 88089
|
||||
|
||||
# Protect against wrapping sequence numbers at gigabit speeds | sysctl-07
|
||||
net.ipv4.tcp_timestamps: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Define restriction level for announcing the local source IP | sysctl-08
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_ignore: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Define mode for sending replies in response to
|
||||
# received ARP requests that resolve local target IP addresses | sysctl-09
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.arp_announce: 2
|
||||
|
||||
# RFC 1337 fix F1 | sysctl-10
|
||||
net.ipv4.tcp_rfc1337: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Send(router) or accept(host) RFC1620 shared media redirects | sysctl-12
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.shared_media: 1
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.shared_media: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Accepting source route can lead to malicious networking behavior,
|
||||
# so disable it if not needed. | sysctl-13
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_source_route: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_source_route: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# For non-routers: don't send redirects, these settings are 0 | sysctl-16
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.send_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.send_redirects: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# log martian packets | sysctl-17
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.log_martians: 1
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.log_martians: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Accepting redirects can lead to malicious networking behavior, so disable
|
||||
# it if not needed. | sysctl-13 | sysctl-14 | sysctl-15 | sysctl-20
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.all.secure_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv4.conf.default.secure_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_redirects: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable IPv6 | sysctl-18
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.disable_ipv6: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable IPv6 traffic forwarding. | sysctl-19
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.forwarding: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# ignore RAs on Ipv6. | sysctl-25
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.all.accept_ra: 0
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable acceptance of IPv6 router solicitations messages | sysctl-21
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.router_solicitations: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable Accept Router Preference from router advertisement | sysctl-22
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_rtr_pref: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable learning Prefix Information from router advertisement | sysctl-23
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_pinfo: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable learning Hop limit from router advertisement | sysctl-24
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.accept_ra_defrtr: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable IPv6 autoconfiguration | sysctl-26
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.autoconf: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Disable neighbor solicitations to send out per address | sysctl-27
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.dad_transmits: 0
|
||||
|
||||
# Assign one global unicast IPv6 addresses to each interface | sysctl-28
|
||||
net.ipv6.conf.default.max_addresses: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Protect the zero page of memory from userspace mmap to prevent kernel
|
||||
# NULL-dereference attacks against potential future kernel security
|
||||
# vulnerabilities. (Added in kernel 2.6.23.)
|
||||
@@ -210,39 +238,12 @@ sysctl_config:
|
||||
# is reset to the secure default each time the sysctl values are loaded.
|
||||
vm.mmap_min_addr: 65536
|
||||
|
||||
# These settings eliminate an entire class of security vulnerability:
|
||||
# time-of-check-time-of-use cross-privilege attacks using guessable
|
||||
# filenames (generally seen as "/tmp file race" vulnerabilities).
|
||||
fs.protected_hardlinks: 1
|
||||
fs.protected_symlinks: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# These settings are set to the maximum supported value in order to
|
||||
# improve ASLR effectiveness for mmap, at the cost of increased
|
||||
# address-space fragmentation. | Tail-1
|
||||
vm.mmap_rnd_bits: 32
|
||||
vm.mmap_rnd_compat_bits: 16
|
||||
|
||||
# When an attacker is trying to exploit the local kernel, it is often
|
||||
# helpful to be able to examine where in memory the kernel, modules,
|
||||
# and data structures live. As such, kernel addresses should be treated
|
||||
# as sensitive information.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Many files and interfaces contain these addresses (e.g. /proc/kallsyms,
|
||||
# /proc/modules, etc), and this setting can censor the addresses. A value
|
||||
# of "0" allows all users to see the kernel addresses. A value of "1"
|
||||
# limits visibility to the root user, and "2" blocks even the root user.
|
||||
#
|
||||
# Some off-the-shelf malware exploit kernel addresses exposed
|
||||
# via /proc/kallsyms so by not making these addresses easily available
|
||||
# we increase the cost of such attack some what; now such malware has
|
||||
# to check which kernel Tails is running and then fetch the corresponding
|
||||
# kernel address map from some external source. This is not hard,
|
||||
# but certainly not all malware has such functionality. | Tails-2
|
||||
kernel.kptr_restrict: 2
|
||||
|
||||
# kexec is dangerous: it enables replacement of the running kernel. | Tails-3
|
||||
kernel.kexec_load_disabled: 1
|
||||
|
||||
# Do not delete the following line or otherwise the playbook will fail
|
||||
# at task 'create a combined sysctl-dict if overwrites are defined'
|
||||
sysctl_overwrite:
|
||||
@@ -259,10 +260,10 @@ os_unused_filesystems:
|
||||
- "vfat"
|
||||
# Obsolete network protocols that should be disabled
|
||||
# per CIS Oracle Linux 6 Benchmark (2016)
|
||||
- "tipc" # CIS 3.5.4
|
||||
- "sctp" # CIS 3.5.2
|
||||
- "dccp" # CIS 3.5.1
|
||||
- "rds" # CIS 3.5.3
|
||||
- "sctp" # CIS 3.5.2
|
||||
- "tipc" # CIS 3.5.4
|
||||
|
||||
# whitelist for used filesystems
|
||||
os_filesystem_whitelist: []
|
||||
|
||||
Reference in new issue
Block a user